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Antitrust in 2018: The Meaning of Consumer Welfare Now
Summary
Modern antitrust policy follows the consumer welfare principle (CWP), the proposition that antitrust policy
should encourage markets to produce high output consistent with sustainable competition, and low
prices. The market dominance of giant firms such as Amazon, however, is opening the door to a
reevaluation of this antitrust standard, particularly from a new antitrust “movement” that has economic
goals, such as protecting small businesses and controlling runaway profits, that can be at odds with
promoting low prices. Penn Law and Wharton Professor Herbert Hovencamp evaluates the merits of
three antitrust frameworks within the context of the law and economic history. While he acknowledges
that business can cause harm to the lives of Americans in ways that extend beyond inflating prices—i.e.,
creating barriers to market entry, stifling innovation, controlling information, or limiting wages—he argues
that the CWP remains best positioned to respond to antitrust problems, although it would benefit from
technical improvements.
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Herbert Hovenkamp, JD, PhD

The market dominance of American technology firms is giving rise to a call for
antitrust intervention that is slowly but surely gaining momentum.
An article from The Wall Street Journal earlier this
year reports some of the statistics: Amazon accounts
for 75% of electronic book sales; Google and Facebook
captured 63% of online ad spending in 2017; Apple
and Microsoft currently supply 95% of desktop operating systems.1 These modern companies elicit comparisons, rightly or wrongly, to the monopolies of a
century ago. “A growing number of critics think these
tech giants need to be broken up or regulated,” in the
way AT&T was, the Journal author observed. “Their
alleged sins run the gamut from disseminating fake
news and fostering addiction to laying waste to small
towns’ shopping districts.” But the one thing they don’t
run afoul of is the very heart of what actually informs
modern antitrust policy: the consumer welfare principle (CWP).2
The CWP stands for the proposition that antitrust policy should encourage markets to produce two
things for the benefit of consumers: (1) output that is
as high as is consistent with sustainable competition,
and (2) prices that are accordingly as low. The CWP
opposes competition-limiting cartels at one extreme
and less competitive firms that rely on higher prices
at the other. Market structure is relevant to antitrust
policy only insofar as monopolies and oligopolies harm
consumers by reducing output, stifling innovation, or

SUMMARY
• Modern antitrust policy is based on the consumer welfare
principle (CWP), which holds that markets should yield two
things for the benefit of consumers: (1) output that is as high
as is consistent with sustainable competition and (2) prices
that are correspondingly as low. Under the CWP, prices faced
by consumers are paramount.
• This approach to antitrust policy, however, is currently being
called into question by two other schools of thought that deny
the primacy of low prices as an antitrust goal.
• On the right, the CWP faces a competing technical approach to
antitrust policy marked by an emphasis not on consumers but
rather on assessing the “general welfare” of consumers and
producers in the marketplace. The more significant challenge
to the CWP, however, is coming from the left, in the form of
a new antitrust “movement” that has a particular aversion to
large firms such as Amazon and Microsoft, and an interest
in economic goals such as protecting small businesses and
controlling runaway profits that can be at odds with promoting low prices.
• This brief summarizes these three approaches to antitrust policy
and enumerates why the current CWP remains best positioned
to respond to antitrust concerns, while also suggesting how
implementation of the CWP could be tweaked to better protect
consumer interests.
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yielding higher prices.3 Factually, the
CWP can tolerate very large firms,
such as Amazon and Microsoft, provided that their gains are passed on to
consumers, and historically it has.
Whether the CWP will remain
central to the future of antitrust is
under question, though. The CWP is
now navigating between two hazards,
both of which threaten the importance of low prices as an antitrust
goal.4 On the right, it faces a competing technical approach to antitrust
policy marked by an emphasis not
on consumers but rather on “general
welfare.” This standard dominated
antitrust policy in the 1980s and early
1990s, and it is best identified with
Robert Bork and his important work,
The Antitrust Paradox, in which he
permits efficiency claims as an antitrust defense, even when the challenged practice leads to higher prices
and causes consumer harm.5 For Bork,
“consumer welfare” referred to the
sum of the welfare, or surplus, enjoyed
by both consumers and producers,
or perhaps even by all of society. His
general welfare understanding was
built on a strong faith that various
practices produced cost savings or
other efficiencies, whether or not these
were provable, as well as considerable
doubt that a large menu of practices

(e.g., predatory pricing, vertical mergers) caused genuine competitive harm.
In the process he gave clout to an
antitrust standard that is very difficult
to administer and underdeterrent over
a wide range of practices. As a result,
many businesses favor it.
On the left, the CWP faces
a challenge from a new antitrust
“movement.” The goals of this movement have been variously defined as
combatting industrial concentration,
limiting the economic or political
power of large firms, correcting the
maldistribution of wealth, controlling runaway high profits, increasing wages, and/or protecting small
business. None of those goals is new.6
They have appeared and reappeared in
the history of United States antitrust policy. Among the articulated
goals of this movement, however, low
consumer prices often goes unmentioned. Proponents, some of whom
are referred to as “neo-Brandeisians”
(after Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis), often regard low prices as
an undesirable outcome, at least when
they come from large firms at the
expense of higher cost, smaller rivals.
Overall, the movement is not enthusiastic about the use of economics in
antitrust and appears to believe that
economics should either be subordi-

nated to political priorities or abandoned entirely.7 Accompanying this
belief comes very considerable suspicion about markets generally, quite
aside from monopoly.8 This movement
exhibits strong ambivalence about
innovation, particularly when the
firms who engage in it become large,9
and it believes that exclusionary strategies such as predatory pricing are a
common device by which firms create
dominant positions10 or force targeted
firms to merge.11
Of these three approaches to
antitrust policy—consumer welfare,
general welfare, and the new antitrust movement—the current CWP
remains best positioned to respond
to the problems of increasing market
power going forward, although it
would benefit enormously from
some technical improvements that
I will recommend at the end of this
Issue Brief.

AN ACCURATE
UNDERSTANDING OF
CONSUMER WELFARE
“Consumer welfare” as it is properly
used today refers to the welfare of
consumers-as-consumers, pure and
simple. Speaking objectively, consumer
welfare is improved by high output

NOTES
Greg Ip, “The Antitrust Case Against Facebook, Google and
Amazon,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2018.
2 This Issue Brief is based on the following two papers:
Herbert Hovenkamp, “Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?” available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3097452 and Herbert Hovenkamp, “Is Antitrust’s
Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?” available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197329.
3 Herbert Hovenkamp and Carl Shapiro, “Horizontal Mergers,
Markets Structure and Burdens of Proof,” 127 YALE L.J.
1996 (2018).
1

The expansive, vague language of the antitrust laws, particularly the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, gives rise to
the feeling that the antitrust laws can do all things for all
people, and over the decades that is precisely how some
constituencies have viewed them.
5 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with
Itself (1978).
6 See Brandeis’ papers dating back to the 1912 Presidential
election, collected in Louis Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness:
Miscellaneous Papers of Louis Brandeis (Osmond K. Fraenkel, ed. 1934).
4

2

E.g., Zephyr Teachout and Lina Khan, “Market Structure
and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power,” 9 Duke J. Const.
L. & Pub. Policy 38 (2014).
8 See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination, 10-13 (2017).
9 E.g., Barry C. Lynn, Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction, Ch. 6 (2010).
10 E.g., Laura Phillips Sawyer, American Fair Trade: Proprietary Capitalism, Corporatism, and the “New Competition,”
1890-1940 at 277-279 (2018).
11 Lynn, supra note 9.
7
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and low prices, as well as high quality.
The most explicit case for application
of the CWP is in merger law under
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
which expressly embrace a consumer
welfare principle to the extent that
they tie merger policy to the effects
on output and consumer prices.12 But
misunderstandings about definition—
often the result of confusing the consumer and general welfare standards—
have complicated the debate about
how to improve antitrust policy and
have affected even Supreme Court
usage of the term. The Supreme Court
has never categorically embraced any
particular definition of consumer welfare, even though it has used the term
several times.13
It should be said that no particular
technical welfare test—whether consumer or general—answers antitrust’s
hard questions about when a particular practice should be condemned.
One must also have a substantive
theory about when practices such as
aggressive price cutting, tying, exclusive dealing or mergers are anticompetitive and when they are beneficial.
The problem, however, is not merely
that the general welfare test trades
off presumed consumer harm against
presumed producer benefits. It is
that Bork gave the benefit of the

doubt to efficiency claims while being
extremely skeptical about claims
of competitive harm.14 In fact, for
practically every practice other than
naked price fixing, Bork emphasized
their efficiencies or harmlessness,
while rejecting nearly all theories of
competitive harm. The result is that
general welfare tests can tolerate a
significant amount of market power in
the economy.
There is at least a temporal link
between Bork’s more general welfare test and the significant rise of
monopoly power in the United States
economy. The 2010 Merger Guidelines, unlike Bork, take the risk of
high market concentration seriously.
Once a prima facie case has been
made, the Guidelines require strong
evidence of efficiencies that could not
be obtained except by the merger and
that are of sufficient magnitude to
render temporary any predicted price
increase.15 These are rarely found.
In contrast to the administrative
challenge of evaluating claims of “efficiency,” the most significant benefit
of embracing the modern consumer
welfare test is that it makes assessing a
transaction relatively straightforward.
One only needs to know whether output has gone down or price has gone
up. That is the only issue to be consid-

ered, and the size of the output reduction or price increase does not matter.
Further, there is nothing to trade off.
Relative to any general welfare test,
the administrative cost savings from
a consumer welfare test seem to be
substantial.
The main challenge facing the
CWP, however, is not the one coming
from the technical and monopolyfriendly right, but the one from the
political and large firm-allergic left.
Ironically, both sides reject the importance of low consumer prices and high
output.16 They simply do so for vastly
different reasons.

ers should be considered harmless unless they created
a single-firm monopoly. He also took extremely benign
positions on all vertical practices, concluding that the best
rule for them should be virtual per se legality except in a
small group of cases thought to facilitate collusion. And he
believed that predatory pricing is so unlikely to succeed
that the best rule for it should be per se legality.
15 Guidelines, supra note 12.
16 Protagonists in the neo-Brandeis movement sometimes
even write as if low prices are the evil to be avoided.
17 A price-cost margin increases when the difference be-

tween the price a firm charges to consumers and the
marginal cost of producing a good or service (i.e., the
competitive price) grows. Higher margins are indicative of
greater market power.
18 Jan de Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, “The Rise of Market Power
and the Macroeconomic Implications,” NBER Working Paper No. 23687 (Aug. 2017).
19 Ibid. at 16. (Noting the profit rate relative to GDP grew
fourfold during the period 1980-2014.)
20 The same consumer welfare principles that apply in product markets should be applied to labor markets as well –

THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE:
A NEW ANTITRUST
“MOVEMENT” AND ITS
FLAWS
Over the last fifty years, antitrust
has become much more technical,
particularly in areas such as merger
enforcement and exclusionary behavior. Today the concern about market
power concentration is robust, and
many observers focus on a specific
indicator: high price-cost margins.17
As firms face fewer competitors,
price-cost margins tend to rise. And
recent literature suggests that market
power, as measured by price-cost mar-

NOTES
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§1, 6, 7, 9, 10 (2010),
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-mergerguidelines-08192010.
13 Five majority opinions speak of consumer welfare. Four
additional usages of the term are in dissents. In Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., the Supreme Court held that end use
consumers had standing to pursue price fixing, making it
the ultimate consumer welfare decision.
14 Bork made no denying of the fact that he fundamentally
disbelieved in the theory of oligopoly. As a result, merg12
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gins, is in fact rising.18 The increase
began to occur in the early 1980s, at
about the same time as the Reaganera antitrust revolution, with its
underdeterrent, general welfare bent.19
Changes in antitrust policy may
be a factor in this rise of price-cost
margins, but they are far from the only
explanation. For instance, during this
same period, the economy became far
more digitized and information-based.
To the extent the rise in margins
results from an increase in fixed costs,
it is not an antitrust problem. Also,
as a result of decades of anti-union
politics and legislation, wages have
been suppressed in favor of company
profits. Most aspects of this are not
an antitrust problem either, although
there are strong arguments for paying more attention to labor market
concentration, particularly in merger
cases.20 But to whatever extent antitrust policy has directly resulted in
increases to price-cost margins, there
is no viable reason for eschewing the
modern CWP—which is much less
tolerant of market power than the
general welfare standard employed
by the DOJ and FTC in previous
decades—in favor of the neo-Brandeis
movement’s unclear interpretations of
consumer welfare.
One advantage of CWP is that

TABLE 1

TOP 10 HIGHLY CONCENTRATED INDUSTRIES (2012)

Industry (# of companies)

Market Share

Search Engines (3)

98.5%

Arcade, Food & Entertainment Complexes (2)

96.2%

Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (4)

94.7%

Satellite TV Providers (2)

94.5%

Soda Production (3)

93.7%

Food Service Contractors (4)

93.2%

Sanitary Paper Product Manufacturing (3)

92.7%

Lighting & Bulb Manufacturing (3)

91.9%

Tire Manufacturing (4)

91.3%

Major Household Appliance Manufacturing (4)

90.0%

Source: IBISWorld available at http://news.cision.com/ibisworld/r/top-10-highly-concentrated-industries,c9219248.

its goals are empirically quantifiable.
The correct rules for determining
what is best for consumers are empirically determined, moving targets,
which change not only with further
economic theory and empirical study,
but also with changes in production
and transportation technology, as
well as demographics.21 To date, the
strongest claim of the neo-Brandeis
movement—its assumption that
individuals in our society would really
be better off if they lived in a world
characterized by smaller firms and
higher prices—remains unverified.
The neo-Brandeisians still face the
formidable task of providing empirical evidence that this is true in a
society where everyone is a consumer

and consumers vote mainly with
their purchasing choices. The goals of
this movement (e.g., fairness22 and
small business protectionism) are not
measurable and are fundamentally
inconsistent, although their contradictions—like the one between the
competing priorities of small business
protection and consumer welfare—are
rarely exposed.
Also missing at this stage is any
serious discussion of remedies, except
for some very general statements to
the effect that perhaps the best fix for
Amazon is regulation.23 On the one
hand, the neo-Brandeis movement
is highly suspicious of government,
and particularly of its power over the
economy. It observes, quite correctly,

NOTES
with a little modification to account for the fact that workers
sell, rather than purchase, their labor. The best understanding of consumer welfare is as promoting markets in which
output of both product and labor is as high as competition
permits. For more, see Ioana Marinescu, “The Other Side
of a Merger: Labor Market Power, Wage Suppression, and
Finding Recourse in Antitrust Law,” Penn Wharton Public
Policy Initiative Vol. 6, No. 3 (2018).
21 The area that exhibits this most strongly is mergers, with
enforcement policy going from severely overdeterrent in
the 1960s to underdeterrent today.

“Fairness” was an antitrust goal of the Democratic Party
in 2016, according to its party platform. As an antitrust
concern, fairness means nothing without a reference point
or set of measurement tools. For reference, the full text of
major party platforms back to 1840 can be found at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php.
23 Lina Khan, “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” 126 Yale L. J.
710, at 797-801 (2017).
24 Lynn, supra note 9, 24, 99-102.
25 Refocusing antitrust policy so as to make political theory
the driver would actually return us to cycles of special
22
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interest capture and protected local monopoly. Consider
the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which prohibited price
discrimination, effectively curbing the power of a firm’s
size. The historical record of this law shows one of the
strongest instances of legislative capture by a special interest group in the entire body of antitrust law. Because the
statute applied only to “sales,” it fostered a great deal of
vertical ownership integration.
26 Brick and mortar booksellers, for example, have suffered,
but their injury has resulted largely from a technology
– direct electronic distribution – that has made them su-
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that government is prone to corruption and special interest domination.24
At the same time, however, members
of the movement argue for much
more heavy-handed government
regulation, and not on behalf of consumers.25 Meanwhile, as this movement strongly emphasizes the role of
politics in economic change, it pays
little attention to changes in technology that provide at least as powerful
an explanation.26
As decades of antitrust litigation
have shown, antitrust is not good
at balancing. The advantage of the
CWP is that economics gives us a set
of tools for assessing the conditions
that are conducive to high output and
lower prices, and thus for examining
the practices claimed to challenge
them. That is not to say that employing these tools is easy, but over the
years we have been able to improve
their usefulness.
In contrast, the broader goals
identified by movement antitrust,
including control of political power
and wealth equality, job provision and
wages, and protection of small business, are difficult to assess and weigh,
and they often operate at crosspurposes with one another. The CWP,
however, actually speaks to some of
these goals, at least indirectly.27 For

example, although wealth equality
and job creation are not separately
articulated goals of antitrust under the
CWP, competitive markets are very
likely conducive to more appealing
distributions of wealth than monopolized ones. Unless proponents of the
antitrust movement provide metrics
for their goals, it will remain difficult
to justify a move away from the CWP
as the guiding force of antitrust policy.
So what should antitrust do about
rising price-cost margins? Should it
entertain calls for radical change, or
hold fast to the CWP? It is worth
noting that two of the principal
targets of movement antitrust today
– Google and Amazon – are not
significant contributors to this rising
margins phenomenon. Google’s most
common price to consumers is zero,
and Amazon’s margins are among the
lowest in all retailing.28 Certainly, big
business can cause harm to the lives of
Americans in other ways than through
competitive pricing. But these ways
need to be articulated, supported by
evidence, and then sorted into those
things that are conceivably within the
domain of antitrust and those that are
not. Promiscuous application of the
antitrust laws so as to make big firms
smaller and prices higher could cause
irreparable harm, not only to consum-

NOTES
perfluous. It is not antitrust’s purpose to force distribution
channels to maintain institutions that no longer perform a
valuable function.
27 Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, “Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality,” 104 Geo. L.J. Online 1 (2015).
(Discussing, inter alia, the relationship between market
power and inequality and offering several proposals for
using the antitrust laws to address inequality issues.)
28 To be sure, either company might be doing anticompetitive
things.
29 E.g., Khan, supra note 23 at 710-711. (Associating the

consumer welfare principle with an excessive focus on
short run concerns.)
30 Marinescu, supra note 20.
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ers, but also to the entire economy.
Objectively, embracing an ideology of supporting lower output and
higher prices would be a disaster for
the American economy, which is in
competition with other world economies that is fiercer than at any point
in the postwar period. The danger that
the political process will force government policy off the rails is real. The
only workable option is to reinforce
the CWP.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVING ANTITRUST
POLICY—WITHOUT A
MOVEMENT
The way to repair deficiencies in antitrust law today is not to resort to an
undisciplined set of goals that provide
no guidance and could do serious
harm to the economy. Rather, it is
to make ongoing adjustments in our
technical rules of antitrust enforcement that reflect what research and
experience have taught us. The antitrust laws can reach nearly every form
of anticompetitive behavior, provided
that they are interpreted flexibly.
Although this Issue Brief is a
defense of the CWP, antitrust could
protect consumer interests better than
it has in recent years. The CWP is not
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without its flaws. It often appears to
be underdeterrent to anticompetitive
behavior because of its insistence on
due process and rationality, administrability and clear proof.29 For
example, too many merger approvals
have been followed by price increases,
and current legal standards make
predatory pricing almost impossible to
prove. By contrast, though, movement
antitrust often makes claims that are
impossible to deliver, or adopts speculative, unprovable theories about competitive harm. As a result, movement
antitrust tends to be overdeterrent.
But in light of the CWP’s record
of underdeterrence, I offer the following recommendations. First, legal
scholars should work to devise better
remedies for mergers discovered to
be illegal. Since judges tend to fol-

low scholarship in antitrust more
than in other legal areas, this is an
important endeavor. At the same
time, the CWP would benefit from
new scholarship driven by the need
to strengthen merger standards—
especially for vertical mergers and
large tech firm acquisitions of smaller
highly innovative rivals—as well as
the need to amend proof requirements
for exclusionary practices. Additionally, the CWP should be adapted to
enable appropriate evaluation of the
labor effects of mergers. In general,
anticompetitive practices affecting
labor markets need to be taken more
seriously.30 While antitrust policy is
certainly not the only reason wages
fail to keep up with economic growth,
its lack of attention in this area is at
least a partial contributor. Finally, on a

6

technical level, several practices, such
as tacit collusion, predatory pricing
law’s recoupment requirement, and
the status of indirect purchaser plaintiffs, should be re-examined.
One place that CWP proponents
and the neo-Brandeis movement can
agree is that concentration does matter, although they currently disagree
about how it should be included in
the calculus of competitive harm. The
antitrust concern with high concentration is a means to an end—namely,
control of higher prices—rather than
an end in itself. The important point,
however, is that established antitrust
tools are up to these tasks. Properly applying the consumer welfare
principle, not jettisoning it, is the way
forward for antitrust law.
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